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Abstract: Large-N comparative studies have helped common pool resource 
scholars gain general insights into the factors that influence collective action and 
governance outcomes. However, these studies are often limited by missing data, 
and suffer from the methodological limitation that important information is lost 
when we reduce textual information to quantitative data. This study was moti-
vated by nine case studies that appeared to be inconsistent with the expectation 
that the presence of Ostrom’s Design Principles increases the like lihood of suc-
cessful common pool resource governance. These cases highlight the limitations 
of coding and analysing large-N case studies. We examine two issues: 1) the chal-
lenge of missing data and 2) potential approaches that rely on context (which is 
often lost in the coding process) to address inconsistencies between empirical 
observations and theoretical predictions. For the latter, we conduct a post-hoc 
qualitative analysis of a large-N comparative study to explore 2 types of incon-
sistencies: 1) cases where evidence for nearly all design principles was found, but 
available evidence led to the assessment that the CPR system was unsuccessful 
and 2) cases where the CPR system was deemed successful despite finding limited 
or no evidence for design principles. We describe inherent challenges to large-N 
comparative analysis and to coding complex and dynamically changing common 
pool resource systems for the presence or absence of design principles and the 
determination of “success”. Finally, we illustrate how, in some cases, our quali-
tative analysis revealed that the identity of absent design principles explained 
inconsistencies, and hence reconciled such apparent inconsistencies with theoreti-
cal predictions. This analysis demonstrates the value of combining quantitative 
An iterative approach to case study analysis 469
and qualitative analysis, and using mixed-methods approaches iteratively to build 
comprehensive methodological and theoretical approaches to understanding com-
mon pool resource governance in a dynamically changing context.
Keywords: Case study analysis, common pool resources,  coupled infrastructure 
systems, design principles, institutional analysis, large-N, mixed methods
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1. Introduction
In a globalizing world, historically small-scale cases of common pool resource 
(CPR) governance are becoming “increasingly besieged and permeated by a plan-
etary network of interdependencies” (Beck and Sznaider 2006, 11). This presents 
a challenge to our ability to understand how and at what scale CPR systems can 
be managed effectively. Some studies have addressed this challenge by compiling 
and analysing databases of a large number of case-studies (e.g. Cox et al. 2010; 
Gutierrez et al. 2011; Epstein et al. 2014). While these studies provide helpful gen-
eral insights into CPR governance, they are insufficient to explain the processes 
and complex linkages that constitute a governance system. To build on these stud-
ies, we need to iteratively compile and synthesize the insights gleaned from in-
depth case studies, qualitative analysis, field and lab experiments, mathematical 
models, and statistical results (Poteete et al. 2010; Anderies and Janssen 2011).
A major challenge for large-N case studies is insufficient information in a 
secondary source to assign a value to a “coded” variable. For example, if the cod-
ing question is “are there conflict resolution mechanisms in place”, it may not be 
possible to assign a coded value (e.g. 1=yes or 0=no) with available information. 
This could be a result of the fact that such mechanisms were in place (or not) and 
the original researcher was not interested in this fact. In this case, the “coded” 
variable is listed as “missing in case”. Short of a follow up with the original author 
or returning to the field, there isn’t much to do to remedy this “missing data” situ-
ation. On the other hand, the original researcher may have been interested in the 
question the large-N study is attempting to code, but may have taken a different 
methodological approach and did not present the information in a way that the 
coder could easily discern. In this case, it may be possible to interpret the infor-
mation that is available to derive some insights about such ambiguous variables 
to make an educated guess at what factors may impact outcomes. This may not 
replace missing (coded) data, but may help augment our understanding that may 
have been lost in translation during the coding process.
In this study, we demonstrate the methodological opportunities and limita-
tions for supplementing a large-N quantitative analysis with qualitative analy-
sis. The qualitative analysis was based on some of the questions that remained 
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unresolved after a large-N case coding, and quantitative analysis, conducted 
at the Centre for Behaviour, Institutions and Environment1 (CBIE), at Arizona 
State University presented in Baggio et al. (2016). Our study further supports 
Baggio et al.’s (2016) findings, but it also provides nuanced account of the meth-
odological limitations of and challenges for case-study coding and quantitative 
analysis by comparing interpretations based on how the problem of “missing 
data” is interpreted. Is the data really missing, or just lost in translation (not 
codable)? We emphasize the distinction between the fundamental data that is 
the textual account, and the coded variables that attempt to simplify complex 
sets of information.
Our approach is consistent with the suggestions of commons scholars 
that we use mixed-methods and/or mixed-theory approaches to incorporate 
insights from various perspectives with institutional analysis and the design 
principles (DPs). These scholars have utilized different approaches to examin-
ing CPR governance, and have encouraged scholars to consider other impor-
tant elements such as discourses, power relations, the politics of scale, and 
historical contingencies (Campbell 2007; Clement 2009; Gruby and Basurto 
2013; Barnett and Eakin 2015). Other studies have used a small number of 
opportunistically selected cases of multi-level or multi-scale CPR systems 
and SESs to highlight the importance of including elements of adaptive gov-
ernance, resilience, institutional analysis, and political ecology (e.g. Armitage 
2007; Chaffin and Gunderson 2016). These mixed approaches have greatly 
contributed to a holistic understanding of CPR governance. However, case 
study comparisons have not, to our knowledge, been formally combined with 
large-N quantitative analysis.
In this study, we examine cases where a large-N coding exercise linking DPs 
and outcomes was insufficient to uncover the complex relationship between CPR 
regime success and those very same DPs, and where a thicker descriptive method 
can help us fill the gaps. As part of a special feature on “context, scale, and inter-
dependencies,” we conduct a post-hoc qualitative analysis of inconsistent cases 
flagged in the analysis conducted by Baggio et al. (2016). Baggio et al. (2016) 
showed that DPs work in combinations, and that different clusters of DPs are 
more likely to lead to successful outcomes. But the patterns obtained through 
the translation of qualitative information into coded information in the form of 
zeros and ones that constitute the presence or absence of a list of DPs alone is 
sometimes insufficient to explain the outcomes of a case study. This could be due 
to the context or the methodological limitations of the study. We use a qualitative 
approach to explore this discrepancy and better understand these cases. Why are 
there cases in which few DPs seemed to be present that are considered successful 
and why are there cases in which most of the DPs are assessed but the CPR sys-
tem is not successful? At first glance, these inconsistencies would seem to suggest 
1
 https://cbie.asu.edu/.
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that the cases contradict commons theory. Our examination of inconsistent cases 
suggests that, in fact, they do not. Only by doing a post-hoc qualitative analysis 
of Baggio et al.’s (2016) quantitative study can we learn this and actually re-
affirm commons theory. Further, qualitative analysis helps refine our quantitative 
methods, and uncover other important variables and nuances relevant to the DPs. 
The understanding of context and an in-depth qualitative analysis of cases that 
are inconsistent with the main results portrayed in Baggio et al. (2016) is, in our 
opinion, a fundamental step to build robust governance of CPR systems. In the 
next section, we summarize previous analyses on which our study is based, and 
define the criteria we used for selecting cases. We then discuss nine cases stud-
ies and examine why they were inconsistent with the predictions of the DPs, and 
make inferences on how these inconsistencies point to other important contextual 
variables and processes.
2. Methods
Our analysis builds on the coding and statistical analysis conducted by our 
research team at the CBIE, which in turn, was built on the coding and statisti-
cal analysis conducted by Cox et al. (2010). Cox et al. (2010) coded 77 cases of 
CPR governance, and found evidence to support the claim that Ostrom’s DPs can 
predict “successful long-term environmental management.” They used a modi-
fied version of the DPs, in which three DPs are subdivided, yielding a total of 
eleven DPs (see Table 1), and defined case studies as empirical studies in primary 
and secondary literature that evaluated Ostrom’s DPs implicitly or explicitly. This 
analysis is limited in at least three respects: 1) because the DPs are part of a gover-
nance system embedded in broader biophysical and social systems, looking at the 
impacts of individual DPs in isolation is problematic, 2) there are practical chal-
lenges to coding presence/absence of DP’s and “success” of a case, and 3) how 
do we understand the apparent anomalies in the analysis of Baggio et al. (2016) 
where cases seem to succeed (or not) even when individual DPs are absent (or 
present). The work in this and other papers in this special feature set out to address 
these limitations. Baggio et al. (2016) tackles the first, Ratajczyk et al. (2016) the 
second, and this paper tackles the third issue.
2.1. Choosing the cases
Ratajczyk et al. (2016) describe the coding process at the CBIE. The research team 
read and re-coded 69 of the 77 case studies from primary and secondary literature 
used in Cox et al. (2010), including the same temporal periods, and tested for 
intercoder reliability within the research team and between research teams. Our 
team defined success based on a coding of previously defined (Ostrom et al. 1989) 
variables related to resource sustainability, collective action, and equity among 
users (see Ratajczyk et al. 2016 for a detailed description). Baggio et al. (2016) 
used this case coding to conduct visual analyses and Qualitative Comparative 
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Analysis to examine the interrelationship between DPs and success. The results of 
the Baggio et al. (2016) study indicated that DPs often co-occur, some patterns of 
co-occurrence are more likely to predict successful outcomes, and that principles 
such as congruence (2A and 2B) and graduated sanctions (5) seemed particularly 
important.
We define the problematic observations or “inconsistences” according to a 
scheme based on the number of DP’s present and outcome as shown in Figure 1. 
Baggio et al. (2016) found that successful cases had an average of 8.7 DPs, and 
unsuccessful cases had an average 4.3, and concluded that CPR management may 
require a “pick nine or more” approach. We use a lenient cut-off for anomalous 
cases by including unsuccessful cases with eight or more DPs, and successful 
cases with five or fewer DPs to select a subset of cases to analyse qualitatively. 
This yielded nine cases that we considered to be “inconsistent” with the quantita-
Table 1. Design principles, adapted from Cox et al. (2010).
Design Principle  Description
1a  The presence of the design principle 1A means that individuals or households 
who have rights to withdraw resource units from the common-pool resource 
must be clearly defined.
1b  The presence of the design principle 1B means that the boundaries of the CPR 
must be well defined.
2a  The presence of design principle 2A means that appropriation rules restricting 
time, place, technology, and/or quantity of resource units are related to local 
conditions.
2b  The presence of design principle 2B means that the benefits obtained by 
users from a CPR, as determined by appropriation rules, are proportional to 
the amount of inputs required in the form of labour, material, or money, as 
determined by provision rules.
3  The presence of design principle 3 means that most individuals affected by the 
operational rules can participate in modifying the operational rules. 
4a  The presence of design principle 4A means that monitors are present and 
actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator behaviour.
4b  The presence of design principle 4B means that monitors are accountable to or 
are the appropriators. 
5  The presence of design principle 5 means that appropriators who violate 
operation rules are likely to be assessed graduated sanctions (depending on 
the seriousness and context of the offense) by other appropriators, officials 
accountable to these appropriators, or both. Is this design principle present?
6  The presence of design principle 6 means that appropriators and their 
officials have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts among 
appropriators or between appropriators and officials.
7  The presence of design principle 7 means that the rights of appropriators to 
devise their own institutions are not challenged by external governmental 
authorities.
8  The presence of design principle 8 means that appropriation, provision, 
monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities are 
organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises. 
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tive findings. These cases would be predicted as likely to succeed or fail since 
they fall within one DP from the average successful or unsuccessful case.
We classify our inconsistencies into two categories by considering case out-
comes and DPs: Type I and Type II (Figure 1). Type I inconsistencies are cases 
with eight or more DPs coded that were deemed not successful. If the case stud-
ies indicate that social or ecological problems stemmed from the particular DPs 
absent, then this finding would indicate that all DPs are important, or that specific 
DPs are important in a given context. If the case studies suggest other factors as 
explanations for outcomes, then we should recommend more attention to external 
or internal contextual factors not captured by the DPs.
Type II inconsistencies are cases in which coders identified five or fewer 
DPs, but deemed the case to be successful. In these cases, the missing data 
may make it impossible to explain outcomes without further examination and 
research. Further, the presence of missing data makes it difficult or impossi-
ble to define with certainty whether some cases are actually Type I or Type II 
inconsistencies rather than the result of the missing data itself. The authors of 
these studies may also provide evidence to suggest alternative explanations for 
outcomes. Whether we can consider these cases as inconsistent depends on the 
degree to which we can assume that missing data infers the absence of the DPs. 
We examine these four cases considering these constraints and relevant infor-
mation below.
The bulk of the cases reported on in Baggio et al. (2016) were consistent with 
theoretical predictions, showing a positive correlation between the coded number 
of DPs and success (Figure 1, blue). Nine cases, however, exhibited a negative 
correlation between the coded number of DPs and success (Figure 1, red). Here 
we deliberately emphasize coded because, given the discussion above, the catego-
rization of a case as a Type II inconsistency may simply be due to
1. A case being incorrectly coded as successful when, in fact it was not or
2. Missing data concerning DPs. It may be that additional principles were 
present in the case and could not be coded from available data.
Figure 1: Diagram outlining the method for post-hoc analysis of cases coded as inconsistent 
with predictions based on a quantitative large-N case study analysis.
474 Allain J. Barnett et al.
Given the potential for missing data, it is very difficult to categorize a case as a 
Type II inconsistency unless there is definitive evidence that certain DPs were not 
present. Such statements of non-existence are rare unless the original study was 
explicitly focused on the DPs (which most are not, and none in this study were). 
On the other hand, general studies typically describe what is present rather than 
what is not, so the fact that evidence for a design principle is not mentioned may 
provide some support for the claim that the DP is, in fact, not present. In either 
case, some speculation is required.
Type I inconsistencies are perhaps easier to make a case for in that DPs are 
coded present (so there is less of a role for missing data). However, there is still 
room for miscoding, either in terms of coding a case as not successful when it was 
or being too liberal with coding one or two DPs as present when, in fact, they were 
not. In the remainder of this paper, we present what we call “qualitative analysis 
of quantitative inconsistencies” emphasizing the multitude of problems that can 
creep in when quantifying qualitative data through coding and providing some 
pathways to gain insight based on other contextual factors. Specifically, we illus-
trate cases in which there is sufficient contextual information to understand suc-
cess or failure of governance of shared natural and built infrastructure regardless 
of whether we assume “missing” DPs were present and not mentioned or were 
actually absent. In the latter case, we may be able to conclude that other mecha-
nisms supplied the functions of missing DPs. In the former, we might conclude 
that DPs and other mechanisms that supplied similar functions provide redun-
dancy in the system, and with it, robustness. In either case, we may gather useful 
new insights from this contextual data. In what follows we detail how this can be 
done using “qualitative analysis of quantitative inconsistencies”.
2.2. Identifying potential causes of inconsistencies
Inconsistent cases can arise from several causes: 1) investigator bias in primary 
data analysis, 2) procedural bias in secondary data analysis, and/or 3) substan-
tive error in which there are alternative contextual factors or multiple pathways 
that account for an outcome. Investigator bias refers to the fact that author(s) may 
observe and interpret the CPR system state based on a narrow range of theory, 
assumptions, and objectives (Degnbol et al. 2006; Basurto et al. 2013). An exam-
ple of investigator bias is when an author examines a case without considering a 
full suite of relevant variables. Since large-N case studies are based on the original 
assessments of the investigator, these biases cannot be accounted for without fur-
ther empirical research into that case. It may be more accurate to refer to large-N 
case studies as textual analyses of the literature on CPR governance, rather than 
analyses of the objective empirical phenomena that occurred in a CPR system.
Procedural bias concerns the coding process depicted in box two in Figure 2. 
It is undeniable that an individual coder’s subjectivity can influence the coding 
outcomes. Coding involves reducing textual data into variables, and thus each 
coder’s biases may result in errors in how such variables are assessed. Both 
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Baggio et al. (2016) and Cox et al. (2010) took measures to ensure consistency 
between individual coders in the group. However, Baggio et al. (2016) showed 
that coding agreement between the two studies was low. This is not an indica-
tion of better/worse coding, but of the difficulties of coding data from secondary 
sources and when the coding relates to what we refer to as soft human infrastruc-
ture (i.e. institutions, conflict resolution mechanism, etc.).
The origin of the first two forms of inconsistencies may be detectible in our 
analysis. First, we may find evidence to suggest investigator bias if the origi-
nal study did not consider the DPs or alternative explanations for outcomes. 
Second, after a subsequent reading, we may find evidence for the presence or 
absence of DPs that contradict our coding, which would indicate procedural 
bias. This result would strengthen the explanatory capacity of the DPs in our 
conclusion, but weaken the validity of our coding. In our examination, we found 
that all authors of the original cases went beyond the DPs to explain outcomes 
of their studies, but their explanations were not exhaustive, and some DPs were 
not discussed. This suggests that while investigators did consider some DPs 
and alternatives, we cannot rule out the possibility of some degree of investiga-
tor bias. Since individual coders in the CBIE team often disagreed in the cod-
ing process, there was a possibility for procedural bias, but since coders came 
to agreements to generate the final dataset, these biases were addressed. This, 
however, does not rule out the possibility that another coding team could pro-
duce a coding with a different set of biases. Addressing this form of procedural 
bias requires greater communication, collaboration, and infrastructures for shar-
Figure 2: Biases and errors that generate inconsistencies between empirical phenomena and 
large-N case study results.
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ing datasets among research teams. In the case analysis below, we demonstrate 
some of these difficult coding decisions that may lead to bias. Procedural bias 
can be partially prevented by developing and testing a codebook with detailed 
instructions for coders to follow.
It is important to note that the lines between these biases and errors can be 
blurry. For example, since investigators do not conduct exhaustive analyses of 
the factors affecting CPR system outcomes, and we only consider un-coded addi-
tional information found explicitly in the case-studies for our qualitative analysis, 
alternative variables are also not exhaustive. On the other hand, if our coding 
procedure is biased in such a way that our coding misinterpreted the meaning of 
a variable, then we may erroneously find that a variable is, or is not an important 
predictor of outcomes. There may still be important variables to uncover. While 
our approach cannot correct for the biases in the literature, we can correct for the 
biases in our process of selecting the variables of concern, and coding. This high-
lights the importance of continued iteration between large-N analysis, qualitative 
analysis, and more detailed case study research. We will show that despite these 
limitations, our qualitative analysis of quantitative case studies vastly expands our 
ability to explain CPR system outcomes.
If an inconsistency is attributed to “substantive error,” it has the most signifi-
cant implication in our approach since it may offer an alternative explanation for 
an outcome. Substantive errors may originate in the codebook development phase 
because it is during this phase that coders are given instructions on what to look 
for, and also what to ignore. Below, we conduct a post-hoc qualitative analysis of 
Baggio et al.’s (2016) quantitative results. For each case, we discuss 1) the origi-
nal author’s explanation for the outcome, and 2) the methodological challenges 
the coding team faced when coding these cases. We then discuss the implications 
of our findings for dealing with missing data, methods for conducting large-N 
case studies, and understanding DPs in relation to context.
3. Analysis
3.1. Overview of inconsistent cases
Table 2 indicates the presence and absence of DPs, and missing data. This table 
clearly demonstrates that Type II inconsistencies had many more missing data. 
Missing data is a significant limitation to large-N case studies. Ostrom et al. 
(1989) recommend that missing data should be addressed by using exclusion cri-
teria to limit coding efforts to those case studies with sufficient data. The coding 
project at CBIE was developed to re-visit and expand on the analysis conducted 
by Cox et al. (2010), and thus our study is limited to the inclusion of cases with 
missing data. Cox et al. (2010) examined the relationship between DPs and suc-
cess individually, which may explain their inclusion of cases with many missing 
DPs. Baggio et al. (2016) addressed this challenge by examining the sensitiv-
ity of results to assuming that missing principles were either present or absent. 
Table 2 also indicates that some DPs are more often absent than others. Baggio 
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et al. (2016) found that data on graduated sanctions (5), monitor accountability 
(4B), and proportionality between benefits and inputs (2B) were often missing in 
cases. Thus, it is often difficult to rule out the importance of these DPs without 
further information. In our subset of nine cases, 2B is missing in seven cases.
Table 3 summarizes the type of resource sector, geographic location, cause of 
inconsistency, and type of error or bias we found. We found evidence for investi-
gator bias in three cases, procedural error in seven cases, and substantive error in 
eight cases. Investigator biases occurred where primary studies did not consider 
the full set of DPs, and these missing data may explain outcomes. Procedural 
bias occurred where evidence suggested that coders had miscoded a variable, or 
where the division of cases into independent time-periods explained inconsisten-
cies. Substantive error was evident in cases where investigators provided alterna-
tive explanations for outcomes, or where the large-N analysis did not account for 
the importance of an individual DP to the specific case outcome. In the following 
sections we will discuss the importance of these local and non-local factors in 
each case.
3.2. Type I inconsistencies
These cases represent CPR systems in which a high number of DPs were not suf-
ficient to avoid over-exploitation of resources and/or increased conflict within the 
community. An assessment of such cases leads to a handful of reasons why DPs 
may not be sufficient: essential principles were absent, the CPR system experi-
enced a disturbance (e.g. market integration) that changed incentives structures or 
impacted closely linked resources resource users have not historically managed. 
However, even in the case of Type I inconsistencies, the relevance of missing data 
Table 2: Present (1), absent (0), and missing design (blank) principles coded by Baggio et al. 
(2016).
Case  1A  1B  2A  2B  3  4A  4B  5  6  7  8
Type I inconsistencies (not successful despite at least 8 DPs present)
Yuracaré  1  1  (0)   1  1  1  1  1  1  1
Ranvahi  1  1  1  (0)  1  1  1  0  1  1  1
Sol y Arena  1  1  0  1  1  1(0)  1   1  1  1
Sol y Poniente  1  1  0  1  1  1(0)  1   1  1  1
La Mancha Oriental  0  1  1(0)   1  1  1  0  1  1  1
Type II inconsistencies (successful despite presence of 5 or fewer DPs)
Historical Huaorani  1  1  1   0  1  1   0   0
Nyamaropa*  0  0          
Apalachicola  1  1     1     1  
Lake Chilika pre-1990*  1    1     1  0  1
Based on the analysis in this article, we have highlighted suggested revisions of the coding dataset in 
parenthesis.
Cases with some coder disagreement on success are indicated with a “*”.
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cannot be ruled out. Graduated sanctions were missing in two cases, proportional-
ity between appropriation and provision rules (2B) were missing in three, and con-
gruence between rules and local conditions were missing in one case. The original 
authors may have underestimated the importance of these DPs, or they may be 
implied by the author’s analysis. Nevertheless, these authors highlight important 
processes that led to outcomes that our coding team coded as unsuccessful.
3.2.1. Yuracaré forest
The case of the Yuracaré exemplifies the influence of market integration on CPR 
governance. The Yuracaré governed the use of forest resources in their territories 
prior to contact with the Bolivian government. They maintained resource boundar-
ies, collectively crafted rules, and controlled use of and access to forest resources 
at different levels, including the clan, the “corregimiento” (consisting of one or 
more clans), and the territory. Representatives from each clan elected a leader, and 
each corregimiento had representatives that participate in tribal council meetings. 
These meetings were used to resolve disputes with other indigenous groups, and 
between those with access to resources within the Yuracaré territory. The Bolivian 
government recognized the Yuracaré management system in the 1990s, and codi-
fied their petitions for land tenure. Becker and Leon (2000) demonstrated that 
the Yuracaré management system ensured the sustainable and stable harvests of 
Table 3: Identification and characteristics of inconsistent cases.
Case  Sector  Country  Cause of inconsistency Potential type of error 
or bias
Yuracaré forest 
system
 Forestry  Bolivia  Loss of congruence  Procedural and/or 
substantive
Ranvahi forest 
community
 Forestry  India  Lack of graduated 
sanctions
 Procedural and/or 
substantive
Sol y Arena  Irrigation Spain  Loss of congruence  Procedural and/or 
substantive
Sol y Poniente  Irrigation Spain  Loss of congruence  Procedural and/or 
substantive
La Mancha Oriental Irrigation Spain  Loss of congruence  Substantive and/or 
procedural
The Historical 
Huaorani
 Forestry  Ecuador  Lack of market 
integration
Resource abundance 
and distribution
Time-lag
 Investigator, 
substantive and/or 
procedural
Nyamaropa 
communal area
 Forestry  Zimbabwe  Resource abundance 
and distribution
 Investigator and/or 
substantive
Apalachicola Bay 
Oyster
 Fishery  USA  Social cohesion
Knowledge
Technology
 Investigator and/or 
substantive
Chilika lake pre 
1990s
 Fishery  India  Time-lag  Procedural
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fruit trees and game animals. But Yuracaré communities were introduced to new 
incentives as they became increasingly integrated into the market economy and 
wider social fabric.
In its historical context, Yuracaré self-governance exhibited congruence 
between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions, but these condi-
tions were changing. In response to increasing market demand for commercial 
timber species, such as mahogany and Spanish timber, Yuracaré forest associations 
privatized and distributed timber species among families within their boundaries. 
While Yuracaré placed a high value on traditional fruit trees and game animals, 
they viewed timber trees as “surplus.” Given the high market value for these spe-
cies, Yuracaré resource users over-exploited timber species, which decreased the 
biodiversity of the forests in the region. These developments led to the overall 
degradation of the forest ecosystem in the Yuracaré territory. In essence, market 
integration exposed the hidden fragility of the Yuracaré self-governance regime 
to the market demand for timber resources. This fragility eventually led to the 
degraded condition of the forest ecosystem.
Coders disagreed in an important area relevant to this case. One coder argued 
that the appropriation rules were congruent to local social and ecological con-
ditions, citing Becker and Leon’s (2000) statement that Yuracaré’s “institutions 
reflect [a] landscape-level concern for sustaining their resource base” (173). The 
coding team, however, concluded that this was not sufficient information to con-
clude that 2A was present or absent. Our qualitative description of the case, how-
ever, suggests that 2A is present for valuable fruit species, but absent when we 
consider the resource system including closely linked and interdependent species 
in a multi-resource system. This assessment suggests that 2A should be re-coded 
as absent in this case. Based on this assessment, we concluded that this incon-
sistency stemmed from a potential procedural error; a miscoded DP. However, 
we also found important contextual information demonstrating the importance of 
the identity of the DP; the congruence between rules and local conditions when 
conditions change.
3.2.2. Ranvahi forest community
Baggio et al. (2016) identified the presence of nine DPs in the Ranvahi forestry case. 
Ranvahi resource users had an executive management committee, consensus-based 
decision-making to develop rules, well-defined boundaries, and 24 hour patrol-
ling to protect their forest from outsiders. But while Ranvahi villagers successfully 
monitored and defended their territory from poachers from neighbouring villages, 
they remained lenient to authorized resource users. Thus, only neighbouring vil-
lagers were likely to have faced graduated sanctions for their rule infractions, while 
Ranvahi villagers were not. Ghate and Nagendra (2005) suggest that this leni-
ency resulted in increased rule infractions, and resource users became increasingly 
frustrated with their management system. Ghate and Nagendra (2005) found that 
a non-governmental organization (NGO) limited the Ranvahi villagers’ ability to 
sanction those who overexploited forest resources. The NGO was concerned that 
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recommending sanctions would create antagonism in the community, and that this 
would compromise the NGO’s ability to implement additional programs.
Ghate and Nagendra’s (2005) suggestion that resource users were frustrated 
with a lack of graduated sanctions implies that this principle seems closely related 
to DP 2B; the proportionality between benefits determined by appropriation rules 
and costs determined by provisioning rules. Resource users who invest resources 
into the management system do not see the benefits of their investments, since 
some resource users can choose to ignore the appropriation rules without conse-
quence. In fact, the coding team at CBIE struggled with contradictory evidence 
when coding DP 2B in this case. On the one hand, Ghate and Nagendra (2005, 
519) stated, “because members go unpunished, even after repeated offenses, mem-
bers who follow rules perceive this as unjust.” This suggests that 2B is absent. 
On the other hand, coders cited Ghate and Nagendra’s (2005) statement that the 
revenue earned from forest contracts were distributed to households according 
to the amount of work done. Coders were unable to come to an agreement on 
whether DP 2B was present, absent, or missing, and cautiously decided to code it 
as missing. Our assessment suggests that while there may be revenue distribution 
mechanisms, overall, the benefits obtained from investing in the management sys-
tems may not be proportional to the appropriation rules because graduated sanc-
tions are not included among the rules. This re-assessment, however, would not 
affect our characterization of this case as a Type I inconsistency. Instead, the case 
was inconsistent with Baggio et al. (2016) due to substantive error; we consid-
ered only the number of DPs as relevant to success. Clearly, the case of Ranvahi 
indicates that it was the identity of one particular critical DP that precipitated an 
unsuccessful outcome. The presence of other less critical DPs, for this particu-
lar context, cannot make up for the absence of one critical DP. This case again 
highlights the limitations of looking at single DP’s in isolation in large-N studies. 
That is, statistical statements linking the presence of a single design principle to 
increased frequency of success in a sample of case studies are difficult to interpret 
at best, and, in some cases, may have little or no meaning.
3.2.3. Sol y Arena and Sol y Poniente
The cases of Sol y Arena and Sol y Poniente demonstrate the importance of 
external, contextual forces generating feedbacks that give rise to resource over-
exploitation (See Villasante and López-Gálvez 2001). Both cases refer to an area 
spanning around 300 km2
 in the south of Spain in the Almeria region. The region 
is famously known for their agricultural exports. Baggio et al. (2016) found the 
presence of nine out of eleven DPs in both cases. However, both have experienced 
resource over-exploitation, scarcity, and a steep decrease in water quality in recent 
years.
Although nine DPs were coded as present, several factors have contributed 
to ineffective resource governance. First, a high demand for agricultural products 
incentivized farmers to modernize and adopt more efficient drip technologies. But 
at the same time, farmers increased the area of land under irrigation. The exten-
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sion of irrigated land was greater than efficiency gains from new drip irrigation, 
and thus farmers ended up using more water overall. This resulted in water scar-
city and an increased rate of salinization of the aquifer used for part of the water 
extraction. Farmers had access to water shares through the irrigation community, 
or through privately constructed wells. Wells and groundwater pumping tech-
nologies have allowed farmers to access water easily and to drill deeper wells as 
groundwater levels declined. Additionally, while well technology masked signals 
of resource decline, the irrigation community did not have a means to effectively 
monitor the condition of groundwater, despite having active monitors. Thus, 
despite the presence of nine of eleven DPs, problems arose from the combination 
of incentives for agricultural expansion, the adoption of new well technology, a 
lack of monitoring of all water sources and uses, and private and common prop-
erty rights for two CPRs. Importantly, the appropriation rules for these systems 
were not proportional to social and environmental conditions (2A). The propor-
tionality of rules to local conditions was no longer tenable as economic, social, 
and technological conditions changed. Thus while the principle of congruency 
between rules and local conditions was essential to understanding these cases, 
it was also necessary to pay attention to how technology and economic condi-
tions changed this congruency over time. Similar to the case of Yuracaré, these 
cases point to a substantive error leading to our characterization of this case as 
inconsistent. The lack of congruence between rules and local conditions was an 
essential element to the unsuccessful outcome. However, we also found evidence 
for a procedural error. In this case, the coding team coded DP 4A for monitoring 
resource conditions and resource users as present. The discussion above indicates 
that monitoring is only partially present, and the difficulty of monitoring aquifer 
withdrawal is an important element in explaining the outcome.
We found one case with the same configuration of present DPs to Sol y Arena 
and Sol y Poniente, but with a different outcome. This case further exemplifies 
how CPRs with a lack of congruency and graduated sanctions are vulnerable to 
changing context. Tucker (1999) describes the case of La Campa, a forest CPR 
community in Honduras. Similar to Sol y Arena, and Sol Y Poniente, nine DPs 
are present. In La Campa, rules were not congruent to local conditions (DP 2A is 
absent), graduated sanctions were not being applied sufficiently (DP 5 is absent), 
and resource abundance had diminished. However, this decline in abundance did 
not constitute overexploitation at the time period discussed. Tucker (1999) argued 
that these absent DPs may weaken this CPR when exposed to disturbances, and 
that economic influences on community members to convert community forests 
into coffee plantations or other non-forest uses may result in overexploitation in 
the future. Insights based on our assessment of Sol y Poniente and Sol y Arena 
further support her argument.
3.2.4. La Mancha Oriental
La Mancha Oriental is a region located in the south east of Spain near the cities 
of Albacete and Ciudad Real (See Hernández-Mora and Gunn 2001). La Mancha 
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Oriental’s aquifer spans around 8500 km2. Irrigation development and agricul-
tural intensification started during the 1970s and accelerated during the 1980s. 
Similar to Sol y Arena, and Sol Y Poniente, farmers in La Mancha Oriental were 
also influenced by incentives to increase production of more water-intensive 
crops, and had similar problems monitoring groundwater. In this region, how-
ever, problems emerged as disparities grew between upstream and downstream 
communities. Castilla La Mancha (CLM) farmers increased their use of ground-
water for agricultural production, which reduced water availability in the Jucar 
River. Conflicts arose because the Jucar River provided irrigation water to the 
downstream Communidad Valenciana (CV). As farmers in CLM responded to 
new economic incentives, a previously unknown externality emerged affecting 
CV downstream, but the governance system had not yet generated rules to deal 
with or anticipate this externality. This finding suggests a procedural error associ-
ated with our coding of DP 2A. While 2A may have been present for CLM, the 
relevant scale of the CPR had changed, and DP 2A was no longer present for the 
full spatial extent of the CPR.
There were signs, however, that farmers in CV and CLM were actively 
responding to these emerging problems. They formed an association, the 
regional platform for Jucar defence, to craft institutions to share water between 
communities. Under this association, CV farmers have agreed to reduce their 
water consumption. Thus, while new conditions generated incongruence 
between rules and local conditions, the La Mancha Oriental has demonstrated 
the potential to respond to new conditions. At the time of analysis, La Mancha 
Oriental was coded as unsuccessful, but this label may be short-lived as farm-
ers and the governance regime adapt their farming practices and institutions 
to social, economic, and ecological signals. This case and the cases of Sol y 
Arena and Sol y Poniente demonstrate the dynamic nature of congruence, and 
the need for flexibility and adaptability of governance regimes for social-eco-
logical robustness. Thus, the inconsistency in this case again stemmed from a 
substantive error; our qualitative analysis suggests that the specific DP 2A was 
an essential element to explaining the outcome where social and ecological 
conditions were changing.
3.3. Type II inconsistencies
The following four cases represent CPR systems in which very few DPs were 
detected, yet the coding team characterized the case as successful. As we noted 
above, missing data makes it impossible to know how many DPs are present. 
Thus, while they are inconsistent with our findings, further investigation may 
reveal that these cases are consistent with commons theory (i.e. eight or more 
DPs were in fact present). We have no basis to examine the role of the DPs in 
explaining outcomes of these cases because of missing data. We can, however, 
highlight the methodological challenges these cases illustrate, and examine the 
original author’s explanations for outcomes. Thus, a qualitative analysis of these 
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cases leads us to postulate how other variables may interplay with the DPs in 
determining success: lack of market integration, resource abundance in relation to 
population size, internal cohesion of communities due to kinship ties, technology, 
and time-lags and political economic shifts. Our analysis also revealed important 
methodological challenges to coding and analysing these cases.
3.3.1. Historical Huaorani
Above, we showed that market integration can incentivize villages to over-harvest 
commercial species, especially when they are not considered to be a part of the 
traditional CPR system. The case of the Huaorani in Ecuador further supports this 
argument by demonstrating that a lack of market integration may inhibit over-
exploitation of forest products (Lu 2001). The pre-1990s Huaorani inhabited the 
forests of Ecuador, located in Napo, Orellana, and Pastaza provinces. Their econ-
omy was based on hunting, gathering, horticulture, and fishing. The Huaorani 
asserted ownership status over their territories, and had some institutions con-
straining forest use maintained by mutual trust, reciprocity and kinship ties. They 
monitored for encroachment from outsiders and maintained social boundaries 
that define common and private spaces. But these institutions were highly infor-
mal and embedded within implicit cultural understandings. Huaorani institutions 
focused on social boundaries, rights of prior appropriation and reciprocal ben-
efits of sharing. There were no rules limiting the amount of resources a Huaorani 
individual or family could harvest. Huaorani only harvested to meet subsistence 
needs. Thus, in the absence of markets that incentivize the production and sale of 
commodities, the simple and minimal CPR regime of the Huaorani was effective 
for preventing resource over-exploitation. This seeming success, however, was 
not robust to the demographic and economic changes that would occur at the end 
of the 20th century.
The fragility of the contemporary Huaorani CPR regime was exposed as it 
became increasingly integrated into the Ecuadorian state and market economy. 
The Huaorani have increasingly participated in the burgeoning market economy, 
which incentivized a higher rate of forest resource exploitation. Exploitation also 
increased with an increasing population seeking to meet subsistence needs, and 
the increasing availability of technologies that improve harvest efficiency. In 
addition to these forces, the Ecuadorian government centralized power and popu-
lations in the region. Huaorani communities are now sedentary and composed of 
larger groupings with mixed non-kin and immigrating non-Huaorani residents. 
These mixed communities no longer exhibit the level of social cohesion, kinship 
ties, and accountability structures that existed in the historical case. Lu (2001) 
provides examples of free riding, stealing, and over-exploitation that became 
increasingly common as kinship and social ties eroded.
A view of the Huaorani over time also reveals the fragility of land tenure 
when powerful groups take interest in these lands. The Ecuadorian government 
has granted concessions to foreign companies for oil production in Huaorani ter-
ritories. Lu (2001) notes that this has undermined the Huaorani sense of control 
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over their resources. Thus, once well-defined resource and user boundaries are 
now much more uncertain and ill-defined. In this case, non-state actors were pow-
erful corporations, with greater power and influence over the Ecuadorian state and 
institutions that affect the Huaorani CPR governance regime.
Baggio et al. (2016) followed the case definitions from Cox et al. (2010) in 
which one “case” was divided into separate time-frames. The Huaorani case was 
divided into a historical (pre-1990s) and a contemporary case. This division of 
cases is problematic because it complicates statistical analysis, since these cases 
are interdependent. Also, it leads coders to use an incomplete picture of what con-
stitutes a “case” to assess outcomes. When we qualitatively re-visited this case, 
considering both time-frames, we observed longitudinal processes that provide 
insight into how the fragility of a CPR governance regime became apparent over 
time. Thus, though these cases were coded as successes in the first time step, they 
were subsequently coded as unsuccessful as the ecological degradation and break-
down of informal institutions became apparent.
We found that the characterization of this case as inconsistent is problematic 
due to the prevalence of missing data. In the historical Huaorani, there may be as 
few as five or as many as seven DPs present (DP 7 is not applicable to this case 
because the Huaorani had not made contact with the Ecuadorian government at 
this time). Some coders suggested that the historical Huaorani had appropriation 
rules proportional to inputs (2B) and graduated sanctions (5). Lu (2001) pointed 
out that resource users engage in social pressure and gossip, but did not provide 
sufficient detail to assess whether these measures constituted graduated sanctions. 
The coders were instructed to avoid a western-centric focus on formal rules, and 
to look for clear evidence of any formal or informal arrangements that would con-
stitute DPs. Lu (2001) states that the “Huaorani social organization is leaderless 
and decentralized, with few limits on individual autonomy and few social obliga-
tions.” This led to a high degree of disagreement in the coding process.
Our examination of this case, however, provides evidence to support the 
speculation that the majority of DPs were missing because they were not appli-
cable. Ostrom (1990) argued that if there is no or very little resource scarcity, 
then users will not invest in costly institutional arrangements (i.e. DPs). In these 
cases, we would not expect to see institutional arrangements represented by the 
DPs emerge. The historical case of the Huaorani illustrates this point. Resource 
scarcity only emerged in the contemporary case as internal and external pressures 
on resources increased (Lu 2001). In the historical case, resources were abundant, 
and thus rules and collective-choice arrangements were not needed. This suggests 
that the historical case of the Huaorani does not fit the necessary criteria for inclu-
sion in an analysis of the relationship between DPs and outcomes as there was no 
CPR-related social dilemma to address.
3.3.2. Nyamaropa
In contrast to the Huaorani, the villagers in Nyamaropa communal area, Zimbabwe, 
did not have any sense of territoriality. Mandondo (2001) argued that the most 
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important combination of factors affecting resource use was the spatial distri-
bution of resource users in relation to the distribution of resources. This spatial 
relationship had implications for household labour that limited resource use and 
over-exploitation of woodland resources. This was especially the case for bulkier 
woodland products such as fuelwood, kraal, or fence posts, wall and roof poles, 
and brushwood. Villagers preferred to collect these products locally because they 
were relatively abundant. Among the few villagers who suggested that woodland 
products were not locally abundant, they preferred to collect locally available sub-
stitutes rather than travel long distances to obtain these products. These distances 
presented high labour costs to households. Villagers travelled further distances to 
collect lighter woodland products, such as mushrooms, medicinal herbs, and wild 
fruits. These resources, however, were also highly abundant. Mandondo (2001) 
suggested that the extraction of these products would likely have less of an impact 
on the forest than widespread extraction of timber and fuelwood.
Coder discussions described Nyamaropa as an unusual case, with little infor-
mation available to assess the presence or absence of DPs, or whether Nyamaropa 
was a success due to some form of collective arrangement. As in the case of the 
historical Huaorani, the DPs may not apply because resource users have not expe-
rienced scarcity, and thus, have not needed to invest in developing institutions. 
The coding team could not find sufficient evidence to suggest that Nyamaropa had 
formal or informal institutions that would constitute management of the overall 
CPR system, only evidence of institutions to manage some portions of the system. 
The Nyamaropa communal area did have some land tenure systems, including 
homestead plots, and a prohibition on commercial extraction and extraction from 
sacred areas. Villagers developed this simple prohibition on commercial extrac-
tion to limit the impact of market incentives, which could otherwise incentivize 
surplus extraction (Mandondo 2001). As in the case of the historical Huaorani, 
these findings suggest that this case is not appropriate for the analysis of the rela-
tionship between DPs and outcomes.
3.3.3. Apalachicola bay
The case of the Oyster harvesters of Apalachicola bay, Florida, demonstrates that 
kinship ties and social cohesion are sometimes foundational to sustainable harvest-
ing strategies (See Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995). This group of resource users 
maintained resource boundaries, monitored the conditions of the resource, and 
developed simple rules that have been codified by Florida authorities. Though the 
Oyster beds of Apalachicola bay were officially open-access, resource users main-
tained tenure informally through tight bonds between harvesters and processors in 
the region. They achieved this by excluding outsiders from access to critical infor-
mation regarding oysters, the fishery, and the local fishing industry. Apalachicola 
bay harvesters placed a high value on the resource and on their shared identity, and 
maintained tight local social networks to maintain the resource.
Rules mediating technology also played a role in the success of the 
Apalachicola bay CPR system. Members of this community prohibit the use of 
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efficient technologies for harvesting Oysters, and only permit the use of labour-
intensive tongs. Florida harvesters have cooperated on the enforcement of this 
rule. This limitation not only limits the efficiency and rate of exploitation, but also 
improves the selectivity of harvesting. This institution suggests some congruence 
between rules and local conditions, but we concluded that there was not enough 
information to mark this principle as present. Also important to this technology 
rule is its implications for community control of knowledge. New technologies 
require a different type or amount of knowledge of local resources for harvesting. 
The Apalachicola technology rules have excluded outsiders from accessing the 
resource by excluding them from the social networks that maintain the knowledge 
needed to harvest the resource using these methods.
The success of this case may be due to the presence of all DPs, but there is 
no information available to support or reject this claim. In the coding process 
one coder believed that as many as 8 DPs were present, but others argued that 
this coding was too speculative, and not based on available information. Based 
on information, we may speculate that rules limiting technology are sufficient 
to establish congruence between rules and local conditions. Also, since harvest-
ers have a “tradition of internal co-operation” and have strong kinship ties, we 
may also speculate that harvesters have informal mechanisms to make collective 
decisions, resolve conflicts, and may rarely need to deal with non-compliance by 
applying sanctions. Thus there are two potential conclusions from an analysis of 
this case; 1) the social cohesiveness of Apalachicola bay harvesters obviates the 
need for many DPs, or 2) many DPs are present, and thus, this case is not incon-
sistent with Baggio et al.’s (2016) findings.
3.3.4. Lake Chilika
The case of Lake Chilika also demonstrates the important element of time. Lake 
Chilika is Asia’s biggest salt-water lake, on the eastern coast of India. The bound-
aries of the resource are well defined due to the geographic delineation of the 
catchment unit. In the pre-1990s time frame, fish harvesters engaged in collective 
action through fishermen’s cooperative societies and cooperative marketing soci-
eties. These organizations are nested within, and negotiate with state departments, 
including the Revenue department, which manages land and resource tenure, and 
the Department of Fisheries and Animal Resource Development, which oversees 
fisheries management, research, and training. The first indications of fragility 
were evident in the 1980s, when the Revenue Department introduced new licens-
ing arrangements, which gave outside investors the right to develop Lake Chilika 
for prawn aquaculture. Fish harvesters in Lake Chilika protested this policy shift, 
and five people were killed in conflicts in 1986. This suggests that it may have 
been inaccurate to code the pre-1990 lake Chilika case as a success, but Rout 
(2006) suggested that collective action continued, the resource was stable, and 
benefits streaming from the resource remained equitable through the 1980s. As a 
result of this policy shift, however, the aquaculture sites changed the ecology of 
the lake and reduced fish abundance. Fish landings were steady and sustainable 
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from 1970 to 1990, but landings dropped to as low as 21% of historical levels in 
the 1990s (Rout 2006).
By dividing the case of Lake Chilika into two distinct cases, Baggio et al. 
(2016) and Cox et al. (2010) could not account for these processes through sta-
tistical analysis alone. One coder disagreed with the team and suggested that the 
pre-1990s case was not successful, but the coding team concluded that the evi-
dence for an unsuccessful outcome emerged in the 1990s, the next time-period. In 
the pre-1990s case, resource users had collective-choice arrangements, but their 
rights to devise institutions were challenged by regional government. In the 1990s 
case, the coders could not find information to indicate whether collective-choice 
arrangements remained, and only coded two DPs as present. The key factor to 
these conflicts and ecological problems was the Revenue Department’s lack of 
recognition of the rights of Lake Chilika fish harvesters to develop and maintain 
their own institutions for managing the lake. Thus, processes that begun in the 
pre-1990s time-period precipitated resource decline and conflicts in the second 
time-period.
4. Discussion
Our examination of what at first seemed to be inconsistent cases yielded meth-
odological and theoretical insights that warrant further investigation. For Type I 
inconsistencies, it was often the specific identity of the absent DPs in a particular 
context that led to unsuccessful cases. Based on available evidence from a review 
of case descriptions provided by the original authors, four of five Type I incon-
sistencies were caused by either the absence, or a potential miscoding of the con-
gruence between rules and social-ecological conditions (2A). Above, we argued 
that DP 2A should have been coded as absent, rather than missing in the case of 
the Yuracaré, and rather than present in the case of La Mancha. In both cases, this 
miscoding was due to difficulties determining the assemblage of species, and the 
spatial boundaries that constitute the CPR system. In the remaining Type I incon-
sistency (Ranvahi), it was the absence of graduated sanctions that led to an unsuc-
cessful outcome, and may have resulted in the erosion of DP 2B, proportionality 
between rules and benefits. Thus, our qualitative analysis yielded further evidence 
to support Baggio et al.’s (2016) claim that congruence and graduated sanctions 
are more likely to be present in successful cases, and absent in unsuccessful cases.
It is important to note that both missing and non-missing data are likely still 
important to determining outcomes. While the problem of missing data is most 
prevalent in what we considered Type II inconsistencies, missing data may limit 
our understanding of Type I inconsistencies as well. For example, proportion-
ality between rules and benefits (2B) was missing in two cases, and graduated 
sanctions (5) were missing in three. In addition, other DPs are present in cases 
to address a CPR challenge that resource users currently or historically faced. 
Our analysis, however, revealed that Type I inconsistencies were unsuccessful 
due to the combination of context and a particular DP. A specific DP was impor-
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tant to CPR outcomes in a specific case in a specific context. By examining 
the processes of institutional change through which a CPR may move from a 
successful to unsuccessful outcome or vice-versa, we may begin to uncover pat-
terns or typologies to characterize the way a CPR is challenged by or is robust 
to changing contexts.
Our analysis also presented challenges for scholars engaging in coding proj-
ects to understand CPR governance. One challenge was finding the appropriate 
temporal bounds for a case. Our analysis included two cases that covered mul-
tiple time-periods. In both cases, missing data limits our assessment of the impor-
tance of the DPs. Nevertheless, we found important temporal dynamics that were 
missed by Baggio et al. (2016) due to their use of temporal bounds to divide 
cases. In cases that cover multiple time-periods, success may be temporary, or the 
impact of the governance regime on social or ecological outcomes may not mani-
fest until later time-periods, or when conditions change. This may lead scholars 
to erroneously link a set of factors to outcomes that were caused by processes in a 
different time period. In the case of the Huaorani, a relatively simple social orga-
nization was successful at time 1 when resource demand was low and resource 
abundance was high but became unsuccessful at time 2 when external pressures 
eroded boundaries, and increased the demand for resources. In the case of lake 
Chilika, a change in policy that did not recognize the rights of resource users to 
organize their own institutions at time 1, moved the CPR from a successful to an 
unsuccessful outcome at time 2. Without considering information available for 
a long period of time, we cannot adequately assess the degree to which a CPR 
system can be said to be long-enduring (Ostrom 1990). Additionally, statistical 
analyses that assume each case is independent are not appropriate for analyses 
that consider different time-steps of the same CPR system as separate. Scheffer 
et al. (2003) have also demonstrated the importance of understanding the factors 
that contribute to the delay between a problem, recognition, and collective action 
to address the problem. This suggests that large-N case studies must pay close 
attention to the relevant time-scales to effectively assess the relationship between 
institutional design, social-ecological interactions, and outcomes.
In some cases, disturbances that changed the scale and nature of social-eco-
logical interactions introduced new challenges to CPR governance. This demon-
strates the importance of congruence between institutions and social-ecological 
conditions, and that this congruence changes over time as resource users adopt 
new technologies, respond to new incentives from changing market relations 
and political conditions. DP 2A captures the connection between institutions and 
context, and thus condenses a large amount of information and nuance. Further, 
the dynamic element of congruence makes coding for this DP challenging. Case 
studies may provide evidence to suggest that institutions are congruent with a 
certain set of conditions, but further evidence may suggest that these conditions 
have changed. Institutions may be well matched with the needs in the commu-
nity within a case study, but exploitation rates may have impacts on communities 
outside the well-defined boundaries of the CPR system, or well-matched institu-
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tions may not apply to newly developed technologies, or closely linked resources. 
Ostrom (1990) emphasized that robust CPR governance regimes were able to 
modify institutions over time based on previous experience, and according to col-
lective-choice and constitutional rules. But the DPs themselves do not necessar-
ily capture this capacity to adapt institutions to changing conditions, or the need 
for new constitutional and collective-choice rules when the spatial boundaries 
or resource composition of a CPR system change. Huntjens et al. (2012) argued 
that a different set of DPs are important in cases that foster adaptive responses 
to climate change in complex, cross-boundary, and large-scale resource systems. 
Our study found support for the importance of DPs such as congruence for suc-
cessful outcomes, but it also supports literature highlighting the importance of 
innovation, robustness, and the capacity to adapt to changing interdependencies 
and social-ecological conditions (O’Brien and Leichenko 2000; Folke et al. 2002; 
Adger 2003; Anderies et al. 2004; Armitage 2007; Cundill and Fabricius 2009; 
Barnett and Anderies 2014; Chaffin and Gunderson 2016). Our study suggests 
that future research is needed to unpack the factors and elements that constitute 
congruence and adaptive capacity.
Some cases did not have sufficient information to assess whether they were 
truly inconsistent with commons theory. Further, in two of the four cases, there 
was some disagreement among coders as to whether the case fit the definition 
of success. This further supports suggestions that case inclusion and exclusion 
criteria are important and necessary for replicable and robust case-study results 
(Ostrom et al. 1989; Hruschka et al. 2004; Ratajczyk et al. 2016). For example, 
in case studies with a high relative abundance of resources, and low market pres-
sures, resource users may not experience CPR dilemmas, and thus, coding for 
DPs may be irrelevant. Future studies may consider excluding these cases, or 
accounting for their uniqueness by capturing the extent to which CPR dilemmas 
have become relevant to the system. This study and Baggio et al. (2016) also 
found that some DPs are more likely to be missing than others. Our study sug-
gests that more research attention to often missing DPs such as proportionality 
between inputs and benefits (2B) may improve case-study comparisons by closing 
knowledge gaps.
Despite the limitations of the Type II inconsistencies, these cases may still 
provide valuable information for understanding CPR governance. If we assumed 
that Type II inconsistencies could not be attributed to missing values alone, then 
the alternative explanations presented in these cases would be important to future 
studies. Well-defined boundaries may become ill-defined when powerful actors 
influence land and sea tenure policies to open up spaces for new forms of natu-
ral resource exploitation. Conflicts may arise between resource users seeking to 
exploit a different set of resources from a common resource system. Resource 
users may exhibit a high degree of social cohesion despite a lack of monitoring 
and sanctioning, and this social cohesion, combined with simple rules may be suf-
ficient to lead to successful outcomes. Such simple rules include those that mediate 
the effects of technology or market incentives. These findings suggest continued 
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attention to case studies and case-comparisons that consider power dynamics, 
multiple-use resources, and factors that contribute to social cohesion (Steins and 
Edwards 1999a,b; Clement 2013; Epstein et al. 2014; Barnett and Eakin 2015).
5. Conclusion
Ostrom’s DPs primarily characterize soft human-made infrastructure that links to 
social and ecological context. In large-N case studies, the DPs condense a large 
amount of information into eleven binary measures. In some cases, those mea-
sures help us the predict outcomes, but there are important nuances to consider. 
Baggio et al. (2016) show that some combinations of DPs are more likely to lead 
to success than others. In this paper we complement the work presented in Baggio 
et al. (2016) by integrating their quantitative statistical approach with a qualitative 
analysis. We found evidence to recommend greater attention to investigator bias 
(unaccounted variables), procedural error (coding errors), and substantive errors 
(the importance or weight given to individual DPs, or alternative explanations) 
that emerge in the process of reducing primary literature to variables, and analys-
ing the relationships between these variables and outcomes.
Our focus was on examining inconsistent cases, but a qualitative analysis 
of consistent cases would be fruitful to identify causal-chains that explain how 
the DPs were implemented and the relationship between DPs and a dynamically 
changing context. We contributed to methodologies by demonstrating the impor-
tance of combining qualitative and quantitative analyses. There were, however, 
limitations to our approach. Given the scope of our study, we were limited to 
literature used in the large-N case study, and thus constrained by the missing ele-
ments of relevance to CPR studies. Two follow-up approaches could be used to 
improve our understanding of CPR governance. First, further studies could gather 
additional primary and secondary literature on the cases analysed here to reduce 
the missing values that are currently hindering a more complete quantitative anal-
ysis. We found that our study generated questions about studies with missing ele-
ments. For example, have new collective choice arrangements and institutions in 
Lake Chilika improved the condition of this CPR system? A recently published 
analysis of this system suggests that collective action and ecological integrity of 
Lake Chilika has continued to decline (Nayak 2014). Second, researchers could 
focus their efforts towards conducting standardized fieldwork to gather compara-
ble data useful for increasing our understanding of CPR governance. Our study is 
only a part of a continuing process of examination, including unique cases derived 
from large-N studies examining single case studies longitudinally or single-cases 
through different theoretical lenses (Campbell 2007; Gruby and Basurto 2013; 
Barnett and Anderies 2014; Barnett and Eakin 2015), CPR games and experi-
ments, and agent-based and dynamic modelling (e.g. Baggio and Janssen 2013; 
Baggio et al. 2015; Janssen and Baggio 2016).
The DPs were originally constructed based on cases that were less drasti-
cally affected by rapid global economic and ecological change and many of 
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these cases are not as isolated as they were historically. The single cases that 
make up large-N studies and case-comparisons exhibit increasing interde-
pendencies with processes occurring at multiple levels and scales (Beck and 
Sznaider 2006; Young et al. 2006; Adger et al. 2009; Barnett and Eakin 2015). 
The challenge of global economic and environmental change also presents 
an opportunity for academics to better understand what factors operating at 
and across scales contribute to robust CPR governance regimes. How have 
some CPR governance regimes been able to maintain equitable and sustainable 
management regimes despite these transformations? What enables governance 
regimes to maintain the congruence between rules and local conditions as con-
ditions change at multiple scales? By understanding the nature of these trans-
formations, and the different sets of factors that operate in different regimes, 
we may be able to develop new principles for understanding how CPR systems 
maintain resilience or robustness within and across political, economic, and 
ecological regimes.
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